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Abstract: We study pollution, mortality and growth in an overlapping generations econ-
omy with uncertain lifetimes. Economic activity creates pollution: the stock of pollution has
a negative effect on life expectancy while higher income (proxying either for better nutrition
and immunity or for better availability of public health) has a prophylactic effect on mortality.
These counteracting effects can make the growth-survival relationship non-concave and lead
to multiple steady states and a poverty trap. An increase in exogenous abatement taxes can
increase the basin of the poverty trap. We study a dynamically consistent sequence of second-
best abatement taxes. The optimal tax is shown to be a non-homogeneous and increasing
function of the current capital stock with the optimal tax zero for low levels of capital. The
feedback effect from the capital stock to the optimal tax can make optimal abatement policy
an independent source of non-linearities leading to non-existence and multiplicity of steady
states, as well as oscillations around some steady states when there are none under exogenous
taxes.
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1 Introduction
The process of economic growth involves externalities. Much of the literature has fo-
cused on positive externalities that are a source of sustained economic growth. In
recent years, however, there has been an increasing concern that negative externalities
of pollution may have significant impact on economic well-being. The economics lit-
erature has focused on the potential long-run consequences of global warming due to
greenhouse gas emissions. The potential impact of global warming on individual health
states is, however, not that well known. On the other hand, the shorter run impact of
localised pollution on increased mortality is well documented in the epidemiology and
ecology literature.
Some studies have suggested that up to 40% of premature mortality is related to
the adverse effects of pollution (Pimentel et al [2007]). This could be particulate
matter pollution which leads to increase of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases,
water pollution that leads to water-borne diseases, carcinogens of both gaseous and
soil contaminant types, etc. There is robust evidence that exposure to pollution leads
to increased cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
and, controlling for other factors, an increase in mortality.1 These effects are present
for both developed and developing countries.
One type of pollution that has been studied extensively is PM10 starting with Ostro
[1984] and Schwartz and Marcus [1990]).2 Samet et al [1995] find that while the method
of estimation affects the magnitude of the effect, it is strong, significant and robust.
A 10 µg per cubic meter increase in PM10 leads to an increase in mortality by 0.51%
(Samet et al [2000]). If other gases such as ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide
and carbon monoxide which are correlated with PM10 levels is taken into account the
distribution of mortality shifts to the right (Samet et al [2000]).
There are two relatively robust findings in this literature.3 First, there is a significant
effect of PM10 on mortality even at very low levels of pollution. Second, the effect
varies across both time and space so that different data sets and estimation procedures
can give different results. By using the insight that pollution even at low levels begins
to affect mortality, this paper analyses the effect of exogenous and optimal abatement
1See Ayres [2006], Miller et al [2007], Pope et al [2004], HEI [2010], Viegi et al [2006].
2PM10 - particulate matter - measures the mass concentration of pollutants with an aerodynamic
diameter less than 10 µm (microns). PM10 is considered to be a benchmark as larger particulate
matter does not pass through the upper airways to the lungs (Ayres [2006]).
3See Goenka et. al. [2012] for a more detailed review of the time series literature on the health
effects of PM10.
2
taxes. Under exogenous taxes, the interaction of a positive effect of income and neg-
ative effect of pollution on survival can rise to non-linearities which generate poverty
traps and multiple steady states. With optimally chosen taxes, there are further non-
linearities that lead to joint fluctuations in abatement policy, pollution and economic
activity.
The interaction of economic policies and endogenous fluctuations in dynamic general
equilibrium is subtle (see Woodford (1994a)). One strand of literature (see Goenka
and Liu (2012) and Grandmont (1985)) shows how state dependent feedback economic
policies can be used to stabilize endogenous economic fluctuations. Another strand
shows that simple policies which are not state dependent or feedback policies can them-
selves be a source of endogenous economic fluctuations (see Goenka (1994a), Goenka
(1994b), Grandmont (1986), Sims (1994), Smith (1994), and Woodford (1994b)), and
state-dependent feedback policies may eliminate the endogenous fluctuation. In this
paper we present a different type of difficulty: while under a state-independent non-
feedback policy (here uniform exogenous abatement taxes) there is only a deterministic
steady state, under the optimal feedback state-dependent policy (here optimal abate-
ment taxes) there can be indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations. Thus, unlike
these two earlier strands of the literature, it is the feedback effect of optimal policy on
state variables that itself generates indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations. In this
paper, the mechanism is the feedback between capital and pollution through optimal
abatement policies but the implication is a more general one on design of optimal eco-
nomic policies.4 In other models of optimal taxes where non-convexities are present,
this phenomenon also bears closer investigation.
A further implication of our results is that care has to be taken in interpreting and
replicating time-series estimations. Since the equilibria are inherently non-linear, there
can be substantive problems in calibrating models which link pollution, mortality and
economic growth.
We focus on the relatively short run effects of pollution on increased mortality. We
study a two-period overlapping generations model in which the young may die pre-
maturely and the probability of survival into old age is determined endogenously
(Chakraborty [2004]). Production of the single consumption-capital good creates pollu-
tion as a by-product. Increased pollution increases the probability of premature death.
The literature points out that increased income can counteract some of the adverse ef-
fects of pollution via better nutrition and greater access to health care.5 We model this
4In Section 5 we discuss in detail the relationship of our model to the literature on pollution,
mortality and growth as this the setting of our analysis.
5Preston [1995] was one of the early papers to document the positive effect of income on life
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by making the survival probability increasing in per-capita income levels. Thus, there
are two contrasting effects of economic growth: pollution which is life-threatening and
increased income which is life-enhancing.6 We study the impact of this formulation
on the dynamic equilibria of the economy and on the role of public policy. It is well
understood that the divergence of social and private costs and benefits will lead to
under-investment in pollution abatement activities. Thus, we first look at the impact
of an exogenous linear income (wage) tax whose proceeds are used for pollution abate-
ment. As such a tax need not be optimal, we also analyse the second-best tax policy.
There is a well-known commitment problem in imposing taxes on future generations.
Thus, following John and Pecchenino [1994] and Chakraborty [2004]. 7, we assume
that the second-best tax is set by a series of short-lived governments who decide on the
tax only one period at a time, in order to maximize the expected utility of the current
young generation. In this framework the dynamic consistency problem does not arise.
Since the resulting environmental improvement does not benefit the surviving old at
the time in which it is enacted, we assume the government is constrained to taxing the
young alone, via a tax on wage incomes.8
This framework generates some interesting results. The two contrary forces that affect
mortality can under very intuitive conditions result in a non-convexity that gives rise
to poverty traps and to sharp differences between rich and poor countries in terms of
the appropriate environmental policy. Under a uniform tax, there can be a low capital
steady state which resembles a poverty trap and in which there is lower per capita
consumption and life expectancy and a high capital steady state, which resembles the
unique steady state of a neoclassical growth model and in which per capita consumption
and life expectancy are both higher. The poverty trap is a source in that any path that
expectancy and thus negative effect on mortality. The recent survey by Cutler et al [2006] documents
this effect across countries and within countries. In their interpretation, income alone is not sufficient
but it is correlated with willingness for effective public health delivery. Our model is consistent with
this.
6We depart from Chakraborty [2004] in making the survival probability a function of two argu-
ments, depending positively on the level of per-capita income and negatively on the level of accu-
mulated pollution, the flow of which is a by-product of final goods production. Chakraborty [2004]
assumes that survival depends on the stock of health which in turn is an exogenous linear function of
wage incomes, so in this respect our two formulations are similar, the difference arising in the further
inclusion in our model of pollution as an argument.
7As discussed in Section 5 their economic model is different as they rely on jump discontinuities
and do not have the feedback effects of optimal policies and capital stock.
8John and Pecchenino [1994] argue that the mechanism of a government setting taxes on the young
to ultimately benefit the young themselves avoids the free-rider problem which would arise if the young
were to enact optimal measures in a decentralised fashion and is equivalent to a Lindahl equilibrium
in the amount of the public good (in this case, pollution control) chosen.
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starts with a capital stock lower than at the steady state converges over time to the
zero-consumption or trivial steady state. Furthermore, increases in the uniform tax can
increase the steady state capital in the neoclassical steady state while simultaneously
widening the basin of attraction of the trivial steady state.9
Turning to the second-best tax the results are even more striking. We show that the
optimal tax is a function of the current capital stock. If this stock is below a strictly
positive threshold, then the optimal tax is zero and there is no expenditure on pollution
abatement. If the poverty trap lies within this region, then it is also an ‘environmental
trap’ in which pollution is never abated. In the region of positive taxation, the optimal
tax is weakly increasing in the capital stock. The dynamics in the case of optimal
taxes are also more complex than in the case of exogenous taxes. First, optimal taxes
can lead to both non-existence and multiplicity of steady state equilibria even if the
underlying economy with exogenous taxes admits a unique, neoclassical steady state.
Second, when the underlying economy admits two steady states, optimal taxes can
convert a poverty trap into a sink and a neoclassical steady state into a source.
Third, the possibility arises that in the neighborhood of either steady state there may
be endogenous fluctuations. The mechanism for this is directly related to the fact
that the tax is endogenous and increasing in the capital stock. The intuition for
fluctuations is as follows: starting with a high capital stock, the associated tax rate
is also high. The tax has two effects. First, by reducing post-tax income it tends to
decrease current savings and next period’s capital stock. Second, the ensuing reduction
in pollution decreases premature mortality and increases the incentive for young agents
to save, thus stimulating the capital stock. Depending on the strength of the two
effects resulting from this tax next period’s capital stock may decrease. Because the
capital stock is lower, the new tax rate is also lower. This has the same effects, but
in the opposite direction, and may lead to an increase in the subsequent period’s
capital stock. There are already the two contrasting effects of capital on premature
mortality and these alone can generate endogenous fluctuations even when the tax
remains constant. However, the second-best tax can amplify these effects and lead to
stronger non-linearities. It should be emphasized that the endogeneity of taxes alone
can drive fluctuations since these can arise even if the underlying steady state is unique
and neoclassical in behaviour.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the benchmark model is developed.
9The former possibility is known: environmental degradation imposes costs that are external to
each decision-maker so any policy that offsets this externality helps reduce these costs and if the
balance is right, actually promotes growth (see Pautrel [2007], [2011], Economides and Philippopoulos
[2008], Palivos and Varvarigos [2011] for an analysis of such effects in a variety of settings.
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Section 3 studies the effects of exogenous (constant) taxes, and section 4 studies the
second-best optimal tax. In this section we first characterize properties of the optimal
tax function, and then study the dynamics of the equilibrium trajectories. The penul-
timate section discusses the related theoretical literature. The final section concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, . . .. Each period a new generation is born,
indexed by its period of birth. A generation consists of a continuum of agents normal-
ized to measure one. Agents born in period t live at most until the end of period t+1.
There is uncertainty whether an individual will survive till old age.The probability that
an agent born in period t lives until the end of period t+1 is denoted by pit, while with
probability 1− pit the agent dies at the end of period t.
Each agent supplies one unit of labour inelastically when young and receives a wage wt
which is used to finance current consumption, cyt and savings for old age, st. Old agents
have no labour endowment and live entirely off the proceeds of their savings. Following
the literature on uncertain lifetimes, we assume that there is a perfect annuity market
in which young agents buy annuities from perfectly competitive intermediaries who
lend out the proceeds to firms for investment in productive capital. Each unit of time
t investment results in one unit of time t+ 1 capital, kt+1 which becomes immediately
available for production and fully depreciates in that period. Thus,
kt+1 = st (1)
At time t = 0, k0 is exogenously given.
2.1 Production and factor prices
The production function is Cobb-Douglas and displays constant returns to scale. It
can be expressed in intensive form:
yt = Ak
α
t
where y is output per worker and k is capital per worker.
The gross returns to capital and labour rt and wt respectively, are equal to their
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marginal products:
wt = (1− α)Ak
α
t (2)
rt =
αA
k1−αt
(3)
Because a positive fraction of savers do not live into old age, the return on period t
savings for those who survive is rt+1/pit.
2.2 Pollution emission and abatement
The production process creates a proportionate flow of pollutants:
ζt = γyt, γ > 0.
The stock of pollutants, zt, depends both on current flows and on past stocks, according
to:
zt = ζt + φzt−1.
where φ represents history-dependence in the stock of pollution. (1 − φ) ∈ [0, 1] is
the environment’s natural capacity to regenerate itself, which we have assumed to be
constant over time.10 Evidence suggests there is short run persistence of atmospheric
pollution of up to a year but longer term persistence is driven by geography and patterns
of economic activity (Windsor and Toumi [2001]).
Environmental policy is implemented by a succession of governments which last one
period each and impose an environmental tax, τt on the wage incomes of the contem-
poraneous young.11 A wage tax is less distortionary than a capital or emission tax.12
the The proceeds are spent on operating a carbon capture or clean-up technology that
reduces the flow of pollutants. The efficiency of this technology, i.e. the reduction in
pollution flows, is assumed to be a linear function of tax-financed expenditures. The
10The literature on greenhouse gases however suggests that there is a critical level of greenhouse
gas build-up beyond which the natural regenerative capacity of the environment will cease to exist.
This suggests that φ depends on the stock of greenhouse gases. See Brunekreef and Holgate [2002] for
a discussion of evidence, and D’Souza and Goenka [2011] for a modeling of the threshold effect. Due
to the threshold effect, there is the additional non-convexity from which we abstract.
11The reason for restricting the incidence of environmental taxes to the young generation is explained
in the section where the optimal tax policy is derived.
12Under these taxes the algebra is more involved but qualitative results still hold.
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proportionality factor is defined as χ ≥ 0. Thus, given the technology, the stock of
pollution accumulates according to
zt = γyt − χτtwt + φzt−1,
which, after substituting for wt and redefining terms, simplifies to
zt = γ(1− ψτt)Ak
α
t + φzt−1. (4)
where ψ = χ(1− α)/γ is assumed to lie in [0, 1].13
At time t = 0, the existing stock of pollution, denoted by z−1 is exogenous. In principle
z is a state variable whose initial value can be any arbitrary positive number, but as
we show below, the long run dynamics of the system are driven entirely by the path of
capital accumulation, so to ease exposition without losing generality we assume that
z(−1) = ζy(0), where ζ ≥ 0 is constant. If ζ = γ/(1 − φ) this would be equivalent to
assuming that the inherited stock of pollution equals the value it would have taken if
the capital stock had remained at k0 since times immemorial. Alternatively, if there is
no persistence (φ = 0) then the dynamics are one dimensional. This is reasonable in
the frequency of the model given the evidence on persistence of atmospheric pollution.
2.3 Probability of survival and the rationale for environmental
policy
We assume that the probability of survival into old age is identical for all agents and
is represented by a twice differentiable function of yt and zt. The level of per-capita
income is assumed to be positively related to longevity while the stock of pollution is
negatively related. In addition, we assume that, if per-capita income is zero, survival
probability is at some minimal level regardless of the stock of pollution and that as the
stock of pollution approaches infinity, survival probability tends to zero regardless of
the level of income.
13This formulation avoids the additively separable implication that as a result of abatement, the
flow of emissions can be made negative.
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Assumption 1
pit = pi(kt) = pi(y(kt), z(kt)); (5)
pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀y ≥ 0 & ∀z ≥ 0; (6)
∂pi
∂y
≡ piy(y, z) ≥ 0, ∀y ≥ 0; (7)
∂pi
∂z
≡ piz(y, z) ≤ 0, ∀z ≥ 0; (8)
pi(0, z) = pi ∈ [0, 1] ∀z ≥ 0; (9)
pi(y,∞) = 0 ∀y ≥ 0. (10)
The only consequence of pollution in this model is that it creates a negative external
effect on expected lifetimes. Given the overlapping generations framework this exter-
nality affects the young generation alone by affecting their expected lifetime utility. As
only the young work, the output is not affected by pollution directly. Thus, there is
a potential for welfare improvement by means of a tax on the young, the proceeds of
which are spent on abating pollution. Of course, in choosing an optimal tax rate, the
government has to trade off the distortionary effects of such taxes on young agent’s
savings decisions along with the beneficial externality arising from growing incomes.
2.4 Preferences
In order to use closed form solutions we assume that each agent has a time-separable
expected utility function of the form:14
U t = lncyt + pitlnc
o
t+1
which the agent maximises subject to the life-cycle budget constraints:
cyt ≤ wt − st (11)
cot+1 ≤
rt+1
pit
st (12)
where superscipt {y, o} denotes the agent’s age and subscript t the calendar time. c
denotes consumption and s denotes savings. cot+1 is ex post consumption for an agent
who survives into old-age.
The logarithmic specification has the convenience of generating an explicit solution for
the dynamic path of the capital stock. Taking the first-order condition with respect to
14The qualitative results hold under more general utility functions.
9
savings,
−
1
cyt
+
pit
cot+1
rt+1
pit
= 0;
and combining with equations (11), (12) and (3), results in the following equation:
st =
pit
1 + pit
A · (1− τt)(1− α)k
α
t
2.5 Equilibrium
Using the market clearing condition, i.e. substituting into equation (1) we have:
kt+1 =
pit
1 + pit
A · (1− τt)(1− α)k
α
t (13)
Given k0, z−1, the dynamic path of the economy is fully described at each point of
time by recursive application of equations (4) and (13). Thus, given an abatement
policy, equation (13) fully describes the dynamic equilibrium. For given k0, the entire
trajectory of the capital stock is traced out by recursive application of equation (13)
while the accompanying evolution of the stock of pollution follows from recursively
applying equation (4). The other variables are updated similarly.
In the following section we consider the dynamics of the economy for an exogenously
given, uniform tax rate. The problem of optimal taxes is taken up in the section after
that.
3 Exogenous Taxes
We first consider the case of exogenous taxes, τ , to understand the benchmark case.
We examine the dynamics in the model and what are the effect of varying the tax rate.
3.1 Dynamics
A steady state is described by the following equations:
pi = pi(k) = pi(y(k), z(k)); (14)
k =
pi(k)
1 + pi(k)
A · (1− τ)(1− α)kα; (15)
z =
γ(1− ψτ)Akα
1− φ
; (16)
y = Akαt ; (17)
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where pi, k, z and y denote steady state values of the respective variables.
Equation (15) can be written as
k = G(k);
where
G(k) =
pi(k)
1 + pi(k)
Γkα;
and Γ = A · (1− τ)(1− α) is a constant.
Under (9), at k = 0,
G(0) =
pi
1 + pi
Γ(0)α = 0;
implying that a trivial steady state exists at k = 0.
If pi, the survival probability was constant, then G(k) would represent a standard con-
cave neoclassical growth mapping, as in Diamond [1965], with G′(0) = ∞, G′′(k) <
0, ∀k, so that a unique interior steady state would exist. Moreover, the dynamics
would be globally stable.
However, with endogenous survival probability, other possibilities exist. Note that pi is
continuous and differentiable in its arguments which in turn are continuous and differ-
entiable in k. Therefore, pi is continuous and differentiable in k and G(k) is continuous
and differentiable in k. Taking derivatives of both terms in G(k) and rearranging:
G
′(k) =
[
Γkα
1 + pi(k)
] [
α
pi(k)
k
+
pi′(k)
1 + pi(k)
]
, (18)
it can be seen that the shape of G(k) can be quite different from the standard neo-
classical mapping, depending on how pi′(k) varies with k. Taking the limits of the two
terms inside square brackets as k → 0, the first term clearly goes to zero and the limit
of the second term can be expressed as:
α ·
{
lim
k→0
pi(k)
k
}
+
{
lim
k→0
pi′(k)
1 + pi(k)
}
where the limit of the first term is given by L’Hopital’s Rule as:
lim
k→0
pi(k)
k
= lim
k→0
pi′(k)
and limk→0 pi
′(k) < ∞ is a sufficient condition for the limit of G′(k) to approach zero
as k → 0.
Thus limk→∞ pi
′(k) < ∞ is a sufficient condition for the transformation map G(k) to
lie below the 45o line close to the origin (see Figure 1 below). This makes it possible
11
for multiple steady states to arise. While this condition applies to the reduced-form
version of the survival probability, it is more instructive to take into account the chain of
dependence of pi on y and z and through these variables on k. Given the Cobb-Douglas
production function assumed throughout the paper, we can express pi′(k) as:
pi′(k) = piy
y
k
+ piz
z
k
In order for the sufficient condition to hold, piy and piz should have exponents in k which
are large enough to offset the denominator. The following specialisation of Assumption
1 is sufficient to ensure this outcome, and we impose it from hereon:
Assumption 2
pit = pi((yt)
β, (zt)
δ)
min{β, δ} ≥
1
α
;
Assumption 2 implies that non-convexities exist in the relationship between survival
probability and its determinants over at least some range of values of y and z. What
is the justification for imposing these effects? Let us consider in turn the two deter-
minants. While the empirical literature suggests that even low levels of pollution can
result in increased mortality, it does not tell us much about the overall shape of the
relationship. It is likely that at low levels of pollution, the marginal effect of pollution
on mortality is low. Higher levels of capital are likely to produce an acceleration in
the detrimental effects of pollution until eventually the natural boundedness of the the
survival probability flattens out this relationship.15
The effects of income, on the other hand, are likely to be more complex. If agents have
Stone-Geary utility functions, then at very low levels of development the marginal im-
pact of growth would be close to zero but once the survival threshold is met, further
increases in income would yield positive effects. This alone would generate increasing
returns in the relationship between pi and y close to the trivial steady state. In addi-
tion, if investments in the technology to meet the populations’ basic survival needs are
subject to increasing returns then again the early relationship between income and life
expectancy can display increasing returns. As for empirical evidence on this relation-
ship, conventional understanding was based on the Preston Curve, which postulated
15Even if the shape of the pollution-mortality relationship does not live up to the above intuition,
a non-convexity could arise from the side of the income-mortality relationship. If neither effect is
strong enough to satisfy Assumption 2, the steady state with exogenous taxation will be unique and
neoclassical; our results on second-best taxation will then apply only to this case.
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a positive and concave relationship between per-capita incomes and life expectancy
(Preston [1975]).
Recent studies, however, call into question this finding, based as it is on a simple
cross-section comparison across countries. Georgiadis et al [2010] have shown that if
countries are disaggregated between high HDI (Human Development Index) and low
HDI, the Preston Curve fits well the high HDI (mainly rich) countries but has no
explanatory power for low HDI (mainly poor) ones. Moreover, Azomahou et al [2010]
have shown, using historical data for a panel of 18 rich countries, that the relationship
has alternating convex and concave segments.16
In the absence of Assumption 2, it is possible that G′(0) > 1 and a unique steady
state with globally stable dynamics would result, as in a standard neoclassical growth
model. In the section of optimal taxes, we shall use the case of neoclassical dynamics
as a benchmark against which to compare the dynamics which arise under Assumption
2 and multiple steady states.
While Assumption 2 implies that for low values of k: k > G(k), it is easy to show that
the reverse is true for sufficiently large values of k. If we let k˜ = (0.5Γ)
1
1−α for given
Γ, α; then ∀k ≥ k˜, G(k) ≤ k. To see this, suppose k ≥ k˜ and that, contrary to the
claim, G(k) > k. Since pi ≤ 1 by definition, then pi/(1 + pi) ≤ 0.5 and G(k) ≤ 0.5Γkα.
By transitivity it must be the case that 0.5Γkα > k. But then 0.5Γ > k1−α and
(0.5Γ)
1
1−α ≡ k˜ > k, leading to a contradiction.
So far we have established that either (i) there is no interior steady state or (ii) there
are multiple interior steady states. To ensure (ii), note that the steady state equation
can be rearranged as follows:
Γ =
1 + pi(k)
pi(k)
k1−α
Given the function pi(k) and any finite and positive value of k, the right-hand side will
be positive and finite. Since Γ is exogenous and positively related to A for τ < 1 and
α < 1, there always exists A large enough that
Γ >
1 + pi(k)
pi(k)
k1−α
16Note, however, that their focus is on the causal implications of longer life expectancy on growth
rather than the other way around and both their econometric specification and their theoretical model
are based on this. Nonetheless their finding is indicative of the absence of smooth concavity and while
our own assumed relationships place the convex segments at different levels of growth than that
estimated by those authors, it should be noted that our general results do not rely on exactly where
the convex portions lie. Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) on the other hand, assumes a concave relationship
between income and survival probabilities of different age groups and estimates the coefficients with
the assumed functional form using a different historical data set.
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This leads to the following result, stated without proof:
Lemma 1 For any α ∈ (0, 1) and τ ∈ (0, 1) there exists an Aˆ <∞ and a kˆ <∞ and
asssociated Γˆ: Γˆ = ((1 + pi(kˆ))/(pi(kˆ))kˆ1−α, such that Γ > Γˆ, G(Γ, kˆ) > kˆ.
Lemma 1 implies that so long as disembodied productivity is high enough to begin
with (given a function pi(k)), G(k) will exceed k for a non-empty interval of values of
k. Along with the results on the slope and level of G(k) derived earlier, this leads to
the following proposition
Proposition 1 If the disembodied productivity, A is large enough, and Assumption 2
holds, then there are two interior steady states, k∗ℓ and k
∗
h, such that k
∗
1 < kˆ < k
∗
2.
Given that two steady states exist, how do they compare with each other and what are
their dynamic properties? The higher steady state, k∗2 has more capital and therefore
more consumption as well as a higher stock of pollution. Despite the latter, it has
greater survival probability due to the fact that higher output more than compensates
for the higher stock of pollutants. To see this note that in the steady state, the survival
probability must satisfy
pi(k) =
k1−α
Γ− k1−α
which is increasing in k.
Figure 1 below represents the transformation map, depicting kt+1 function of kt. Note
that in drawing Figure 1, we hold constant the uniform tax rate, τ .
The 45o line represents potential steady states. G(k) is S-shaped upwards, sharing its
origin with the 45o line and intersecting it at two other points k∗ℓ , k
∗
h. Since, for points
which lie between the origin and k∗1, G(k) lies below the 45
o line, any path starting off
with k0 ∈ (0, k
∗
ℓ ) will converge to the trivial steady state, while for points between k
∗
ℓ
and k∗h, G(k) lies above the 45
o line, any path starting off at k0 > k
∗
ℓ will converge to
k∗h.
k∗ℓ represents a poverty trap not just in the sense that it is the steady state with lower
levels of economic activity and pollution flows, but also in the sense that it represents
a threshold starting point below which the equilibrium path of the economy converges
asymptotically towards zero. We shall therefore refer to this type of steady state as a
‘poverty trap’. k∗h represents a stable steady state, which resembles locally the unique
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Figure 1: Multiple steady states
steady state of a neoclassical growth model. We shall refer to this type of steady state
as a ‘neoclassical steady state’ even when it is paired with a poverty trap.
It should finally be noted that strict concavity of G(k) can lead it to slope downward at
some point. A necessary condition for this to happen is pi′(k) < 0, which can happen
at high enough values of k. To be precise, G(k) can slope downwards as it crosses
the 45o line from above, leading to oscillations and limit cycles in the stock of capital
and the flow of emissions around the upper steady state.17 While this possibility is
of theoretical interest, to pursue it further would benefit from using a more general
framework, rather than the simpler one we have chosen to characterise the effects
3.2 Comparative statics
To understand the interaction between pollution, mortality and income we carry out a
comparative static exercise for an increase in the tax rate on emissions. This has the
following effect on G(k):
∂G(k)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
k
=
[
−
pi
1 + pi
−
[piz
γψ
1−φ
](1− τ)Akα
(1 + pi)2
]
(1− α)Akα (19)
where piz is the partial of pi with respect to z alone (the effect of k on z is accounted for
by the rest of the numerator in the second term). The above derivative is ambiguous
17Note that G(k) cannot slope downwards at the low steady state, even if pi′(k) < 0.
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Figure 2: A uniform increase in the tax rate.
in sign because piz < 0. An increase in τ lowers net wage incomes, which at constant pi
tends to lower G(k). However, it raises pi through its negative effect on z. This tends
to work against the downward shift in G(k). However, the effects on pi are weighted
by kα. Whatever the net effect on pi, this term is likely to be dominated by the direct
effect of τ on wage income for low values of k. Thus G(k) is likely to shift down at low
levels of k even if it shifts up at higher levels. These combinations of effects are shown
in Figure 2.
As can be seen, an increase in τ causes a downward shift in G(k) at low levels of capital
stock but upwards at the high capital stock. There are two new steady states, k∗′1 and
k∗′2 , with the former being unstable and the latter being stable. Compared with their
respective predecessors, both steady states are at higher levels of capital stock. The
dynamic implications of this shift are that while the range of starting points which
lead to a poverty trap has now increased from the interval [0, k∗1] to the interval [0, k
∗′
1 ]
for economies that start of to the right of k∗′1 will be on a path of convergence a
higher steady state than before, with higher capital as well as higher expectations of
longevity. In other words, with an arbitrary stationary tax, it is possible that initially
poor economies become more likely to end up in a poverty trap while initially wealthy
economies actually become wealthier as the curbs on pollution raise expected lifetimes
and stimulate further capital accumulation.
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3.3 An example of pi(k)
Assuming the specific functional form:
pi = piApiB
where
piA =
pi + yβ
1 + yβ
then it can be shown that piAy > 0 if pi < 1 and that pi
A
yy ≤ 0 if and only if y ≤
[(β − 1)/(1 + β)]1/β so that for any β > 1, piA(y) is S-shaped upwards.
If similarly,
piB =
1
1 + zδ
then it can be shown that piB < 0 and that piBzz ≤ 0 if and only if z ≤ [(δ−1)/(1+δ)]
1/δ
so that for any δ > 1, piB(z) is reverse S-shaped downwards.
Thus, the above function satisfies the sufficient conditions for multiple steady states.
Indeed it can be shown that, after imposing the steady state relationship between y,
z and k and totally differentiating, that a sufficient condition for pi′(k) to satisfy the
conditions of Lemma 1 as k approaches zero is that
min{β, δ} >
1
α
> 1
The above ensures that limk→0 pi
′(k) = 0, which is stronger than what is needed for
Lemma 1.
If we consider a special case where pi = 0, then pi′(0) = 0 so long as β > 1/α. Actually,
for that case, it can be shown that a weaker condition can suffice to generate G′(0) = 0,
i.e.
β >
1− α
α
This is because the combination of the terms
G
′(k) =
[
Γkα
1 + pi(k)
] [
α
pi(k)
k
−
pi′(k)
1 + pi(k)
]
.
can converge to zero even if each term inside the square brackets does not.
Another special case is to assume piA = p¯i so that growth affects survival probability
only through pollution. This case could also lead to multiple steady states if δ > 1/α
and could also be used as a vehicle for studying optimal tax policy but because it
implies a counter-factually monotonic and negative impact of growth on survival, we
ignore it.
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Returning to the main functional form assumed above, for the following set of param-
eter values,
α = 1/3, A = 2, γ = 1, pi = 0.0, β = δ = 5, ψ = 0.8, φ = 0.1;
MATLAB was used to solve for steady states at different values of τ . The results were
τ k∗ℓ k
∗
h
0.00 0.0339 0.0965
0.15 0.0404 0.1136
0.35 0.0686 0.1026
In increasing the tax from a no-tax benchmark, the levels of capital per worker rises in
both steady states, illustrating the possibility that an arbitrary imposition of environ-
mental taxes can hinder growth in low-income economies, by expanding the size of the
poverty trap, while simultaneously promoting it in high-income ones by increasing the
size of the steady level of capital and output per worker. Increasing the tax rate even
further, however, results in the conventional effect at the higher steady state, while
continuing to expand the poverty trap at the lower end.
4 Optimal taxes
We now assume that in each period t, a government chooses an optimal tax to maximise
the expected lifetime welfare of the generation born in that period (see John and
Pecchenino [1994], and Chakraborty [2004]). In choosing the tax, it takes the inherited
stocks of capital and pollution as given but takes into account the effect of its abatement
policy on the savings and expected lifetimes of the contemporaneous young. Its problem
is stated as:
max
τt
U t = lncyt + pitlnc
o
t+1
subject to the agents’ budget constraints (11), (12), the equation of motion for capital,
(13), and the equation of motion for the stock of pollution (4) and size restrictions on
the tax rate: 1 ≥ τ ≥ 0.
After substituting for cyt , c
o
t+1 and kt+1 from equations (11), (12) and (13) respectively
into the objective function, the problem can be seen to be a static one:
max
τt
V (kt, τt) = ln
(
(1− τt)(1− α)Ak
α
t
1 + pi(kt)
)
+ pi(kt)ln
(
α(1− α)αA1+α(1− τ)αk2α
pi(kt)1−α(1 + pi(kt))α
)
.
(20)
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In other words, the optimal wage tax at time t depends only on the capital stock at
time t, since capital accumulation has been endogenised and accounted for.
The first-order condition can, after rearrangement, be expressed as:
dVt
dτt
=
[
lncot+1 −
2− α + pit
1 + pit
]
·
∂pit
∂τt
−
1 + αpit
1− τt
≤ 0; (21)
where < 0 implies τt = 0.
With some further restrictions, the above condition underlies a policy function, τt =
h(kt). Substituting the solution into equation (13) for capital accumulation yields
kt+1 = G(h(kt), kt). The dynamic path of the economy is traced out by repeated
iteration of the above. A steady state of the economy with optimal taxes is given by a
pair k and τ = h(k) such that k = G(h(k), k).
The terms in the above expression represent the following effects: the direct effects
of a tax on wage incomes, and the indirect effects working through induced changes
in survival probability. The direct effects reduce both consumption and savings by
the young, and are negative. These are captured by the last term in the optimality
condition. The indirect effects are captured in the term inside square brackets. An
environmental tax raises survival probability, leading to higher expected utility in old
age. At the same time the higher survival probability reduces actual consumption at
both young and old age, the first because savings are increasing in survival probability;
the second because although individuals save more the return to their annuities yields
less because of the higher survival ratio of the population. The last effect can be
confirmed from equation (20) which is decreasing in pi. The intuition is that while
per-capita old-age capital increases by a factor of [pi/(1 + pi)]α, the market return on a
unit annuity decreases by a factor 1/pi. Indeed for an environment tax to be optimal,
the gains from higher life expectancy have to outweigh the other effects and that in
turn requires a minimum level of old-age consumption to begin with.
Proposition 2 If k0 is below some threshold level k, then the optimal environmental
tax, τ ∗ = 0.
Proof : From (21) we see that a necessary condition for τ ∗ > 0 is
Ωt =
[
lncot+1 −
2− α + pit
1 + pit
]
> 0.
At low levels of initial capital, k0, this is not going to hold. This is because the negative
term in Ωt is always non-zero while the positive term approaches zero (or minus infinity
19
given the logarithmic specification) as the capital stock approaches zero. Thus there
exists some threshold level k; such that for any k0 < k, Ω < 0.
To see the potential for a positive tax at higher levels of capital, consider how Ω behaves
as capital rises, abstracting for now from the equilibrium path. In principle, there will
always be an arbitrarily high level of kt such that Ωt > 0. This is because the first term
in Ωt has the potential to increase monotonically with kt, at least after some threshold,
while the second term is always bounded in the interval [(3−α)/2, (2+ pi−α)/(1+ pi]
and within this interval, it falls with increases in pit. c
o
t+1 rises monotonically with
kt even when pit rises as well. If along the dynamic path, the detrimental effects of
pollution make pit start declining in kt, then c
o
t+1 rises even faster with kt. At some
level of development, Ωt will be positive and increasing in capital. The other negative
term in the first-order condition is similarly bounded above at (1+α), when evaluated
at a zero tax rate. Thus, at a second critical level of development, an interior solution
will arise for a positive optimal tax. The question is what level of development has to
be reached before it arises and to what extent this level coincides with potential steady
states of the economy.
To pursue these conjectures more rigorously, we first establish some general conditions
for the applicability of a positive environmental tax at some threshold level of income.
Let the right-hand side of equation (21) be denoted by:
H(kt, τt) = Ωt ·
∂pit
∂τt
−
1 + αpit
1− τt
The first condition needed for a well-behaved tax function is
∂H
∂τt
∣∣∣∣
H=0
< 0.
In other words, that the second-order condition is satisfied whenever the first-order
condition holds as an equality.
The second condition ensuring a well behaved tax function is:
∂H
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
τ=0,H=0
> 0.
In other words, evaluated at the point where the first-order condition first holds as an
equality at a zero tax, it is upward sloping in kt. Note that at very low levels of the
capital stock, this may not be true but what the above condition requires is that it be
true in the neighbourhood of the threshold where an optimal tax first arises.
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To explore the above conditions further, differentiate H with respect to its arguments
(time scripts will be suppressed as all variables are contemporaneous. After some
manipulation, these derivatives can be written as
∂H
∂τ
= Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
−
2α
1− τ
∂pi
∂τ
−
1 + αpi
(1− τ)2
−
pi(1 + pi) + (1− α)
pi(1 + pi)2
(
∂pi
∂τ
)2
; (22)
∂H
∂k
=
∂Ω
∂k
∂pi
∂τ
+ Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
−
α
1− τ
∂pi
∂k
; (23)
where
∂Ω
∂k
=
2α
k
−
(1 + pi)2 − pi − α
(1 + pi)2
νπk
where νπk is the elasticity of survival probability with respect to capital. This is
eventually decreasing in k due to the positive and eventually diminishing effects of
greater income and the negative and eventually increasing effects of higher pollution.
It can turn negative at some point; however, we shall restrict our analysis to cases
where it remains strictly positive.
None of the above terms can be signed unambiguously but two comments are in order.
First, as noted before, a positive effect of k on Ω is necessary for the first-order condition
to eventually hold. What this in turn requires is that along the infra-marginal path of
capital, i.e. before the first-order condition kicks in, there is some range of values of
k where the elasticity of survival probability with respect to the capital stock (taking
into account both the beneficial and detrimental effects) is sufficiently small. As noted
above, this elasticity will eventually diminish with growth in the capital stock, implying
the existence of a threshold value of capital after which ∂Ω/∂k > 0. From hereon
we neglect consideration of values of k below this threshold, as for the purposes of
deriving an environmental tax, such values of k cannot admit positive solutions for
τ . Second, a sufficient condition for the second-order condition for τ to be negative is
that pi is concave in τ . However, this is likely to be too restrictive, given the following
relationship between the second-order derivatives of pi with respect to τ and z:
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= (ψγAkα)2
∂2pi
∂z2
Thus, pi will be concave in τ if and only if it is downwards concave in z. But given
the likely impact of pollution levels on survival probability, this portion of the pi − z
relationship applies at lower levels of pollution, when it is less likely that the first-order
condition for an optimal tax will hold as an equality. At higher levels, it is unlikely
that pi is concave in τ . This rules out imposing concavity on the pi − τ relationship as
a sufficient condition for ensuring the validity of the second-order condition.
21
To proceed further, we turn to the specific example of the survival probability assumed
earlier.
pi = piApiB =
[
pi + yβ
1 + yβ
] [
1
1 + zδ
]
In the following subsections we first analyse the sign of ∂2pi/∂τ 2 and then the sign of
∂2pi/(∂τ∂k)
4.1 The second-order condition, ∂H/∂τ
The following expressions are derived for the specific form (time scripts are again
suppressed).
∂pi
∂τ
= piA
ψδγAkαzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
> 0; (24)
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(ψγAkα)2δzδ−2
(1 + zδ)3
[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]
.
By comparing the two expressions, the latter can be written as
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(
ψγAkαδ
z(1 + zδ)
·
∂pi
∂τ
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]


>
=
<

 0 as zδ


>
=
<


δ − 1
δ + 1
,
confirming the dependence of the sign of ∂2pi/∂τ 2 on that of ∂2pi/∂z2. To proceed fur-
ther with an analysis of the second-order condition, equation (22), note from equation
(4) that:
γAkαt =
zt − φzt−1
1− ψτt
.
Suppressing time subscripts, let us write this as
γAkα =
z − φz′
1− ψτ
,
where z′ = zt−1. The above can be further modified:
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(
ψδ(z − φz′)
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)
·
∂pi
∂τ
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]
Now, from equation (21),
Ω ≤
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
∀ τ
Thus, taking the term involving ∂2pi/∂τ 2 in equation (22),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
≤
(
1 + αpi
1− τ
ψδ(z − φz′)
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]
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Combining with one of the other terms in equation (22)
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
−
1 + αpi
(1− τ)2
≤
[
1 + αpi
1− τ
] [
ψδ(z − φz′)
[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)
−
1
1− τ
]
(25)
The sign of the above term will depend on the sign of the term inside square brackets.
After some manipulation, the sign of the latter can be shown to be negative if the
following holds:
−
[1− ψ{1 + δ(1− τ)}]zδ
(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)(1− τ)
< 0
A sufficient condition for the above term to be negative for all values of endogenous
variables is ψ < 1/(1 + δ).18
If we restrict attention to steady states, then a weaker condition suffices. Note that at
a steady state, (z − φz′) = (1− φ)z and ∂2pi/∂τ 2 can be written as
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(
ψδ(1− φ)
(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)
·
∂pi
∂τ
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)
]
.
Repeating the steps from equation (25), we arrive at an expression whose sign, if
negative, will ensure that the second-order condition is met:
−
[1− ψφτ − ψ(1− φ){1 + δ(1− τ)}]zδ
(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)(1− τ)
. (26)
A sufficient condition for the sign to be negative is that
ψ[φτ + (1− φ)(1 + δ(1− τ)] < 1. (27)
In turn, the above is achieved if ψ/[(1+δ)(1−φ)] < 1, which is weaker than the general
condition, since for (1 + δ)(1 − φ) < 1, any ψ < 1 will satisfy the condition, while for
(1 + δ)(1− φ) > 1, the above is less restrictive than ψ < 1/(1 + δ) for any φ > 0.19
We have therefore established:
18By extending the comparison with the sign of Ω · ∂2pi/∂τ2 to other terms in the expression for
∂2H/∂τ2 even weaker conditions can be derived. But as with the above, to ensure negativity of the
second-order condition for all admissible values of endogenous variables, the above condition still
applies.
19It can be shown that if (1 + δ)(1− φ) > 1, then the term inside square brackets in the numerator
of equation (27) increases in τ so that it reaches a maximum at τ = 1, where its value is unity;
if (1 + δ)(1 − φ) = 1 then the term inside square brackets equals unity at all values of τ and if
(1 + δ)(1 − φ) < 1 than the term inside the square brackets reaches a maximum at τ = 0, where its
value is (1 + δ)(1− φ) and is by assumption, less than unity. This is why the restriction in equation
(27) applies at all values of τ .
Lemma 2 A sufficient condition for ∂H/∂τ to be negative at all values of endogenous
variables and along the entire dynamic path is ψ/(1 + δ) < 1. In the steady state, a
weaker condition suffices to ensure the validity of the second-order condition, ψ/[(1 +
δ)(1− φ)] < 1.
Recall that ψ =
χ(1− α)
γ
, where χ is the effectiveness of the abatement technology
γ is how polluting is the productive activity. As we would expect, if the first is low
enough and/or the second high enough, then the second order condition holds, or in
other words there is an interior solution.
4.2 The sign of ∂H/∂k
Note the following derivatives for the assumed function form (time indices continue to
be suppressed):
∂piA
∂k
=
α
k
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)2
(28)
∂piB
∂k
= −
αγ(1− ψτ)Akα
k
δzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
(29)
∂pi
∂k
= piB
α
k
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)2
− piA
αγ(1− ψτ)Akα
k
δzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
(30)
Further, using the definitions of piA, piB, and pi, and noting that γ(1−ψτ)Akα = z−φz′,
we can express equation (30) as
∂pi
∂k
=
αpi
k
[
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)(pi + yβ)
−
δ(z − φz′)zδ−1
(1 + zδ)
]
which implies that
νπk = α
[
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)(pi + yβ)
−
δ(z − φz′)zδ−1
(1 + zδ)
]
where νπk has been defined as the elasticity of pi with respect to k.
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Now, to derive the sign of ∂2H/(∂τ∂k), we proceed in two steps. We first derive an
expression for ∂2pi/(∂τ∂k) and then use it to evaluate the sign of ∂2H/(∂τ∂k).
20Throughout the analysis, we assume that νpik remains positive, although as we have noted before,
a negative value is entirely possible under some conditions, and if it happens there can be oscillations
around the high steady state.
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The first step is accomplished by taking the total derivative of ∂pi/∂τ , equation (24),
with respect to k. After imposing some definitions and equalities, and rearranging
terms, it can be shown that:
k
∂pi/∂τ
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
= νπk + αδ
(z − φz′)
z(1 + zδ)
+ αφ
z′
z
> 0.
The full derivation is outlined in the Appendix. From here it is easy to establish the
following:
Lemma 3 H(k, τ) = 0 =⇒ ∂H/∂k ≥ 0.
Proof : First, the expression for ∂2pi/∂τ∂k implies that
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
≥
∂pi
∂τ
1
k
νπk.
Second F = 0 implies that
Ω =
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
.
Therefore, referring to equation (23),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
≥
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
k
νπk.
Now, referring to the negative term in equation (23),
α
(1− τ)
∂pi
∂k
=
αpi
(1− τ)k
ντk
Combine the two terms in equation (23),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
−
αpi
(1− τ)k
νπk ≥
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
k
νπk −
αpi
(1− τ)k
νπk ≥
1
(1− τ)k
νπk ≥ 0
Note that we have derived the above result for all values of τ . Thus, as an economy’s
capital stock grows hypothetically larger, the slack in H diminishes until finally an
interior solution is reached.
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4.3 Positive taxes:
From this we can now establish:
Proposition 3 Provided that the second-order condition for optimal taxes is satisfied,
and that the initial level of capital is above a threshold k˜ such that for all k > k˜,
∂Ω/∂k > 0, there (i) exists a function h : [k˜,∞) −→ [0, 1] such that optimal τ = h(k);
(ii) h(k) is (weakly) increasing in k.
Proof : The first part follows from the strict monotonicity of H in both τ and k. Since
H is strictly decreasing in τ for all k under the assumed conditions, then for any k in
the relevant interval, either (i) H(0, k) ≤ 0, or (ii) H(1, k) > 0 or (iii) H(τ, k) = 0 for
some τ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, τ uniquely solves the relevant case for H at given k, because
for any τ ′ > τ , in case (i) τ = 0 and τ ′ > 0 worsens the slack in H; in case (ii) if τ = 1
then τ ′ lies outside the unit interval and in case (iii) since H(τ, k) = 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1],
then H(τ ′, k) < 0. Similar argument rules out the possibility that τ ′ < τ also solves H
for a given k.
The second part follows from
∂h(k)
∂k
∣∣∣∣
H=0
= −
Hk
Hτ
≥ 0.
while ∀k ∈ [k˜,∞), H(0, k) < 0⇒ τ = 0 and H(1, k) > 0⇒ τ = 1.
Since Hk is positive, at low values of k, τ = 0 so that h(k) is flat at the no-tax
equilibrium over this region. Note that F (1, k) > 0 is likely to be ruled by the fact
that the negative term in H approaches −∞ at all values of k, so the likely shape of
h(k) is flat at low values of k followed by an upward sloping portion which remains
asymptotically bounded away from zero.
4.4 Dynamics of the optimal tax:
A steady state with optimal taxation is characterised by two simultaneous equations.
k =
pi(k, τ)
1 + pi(k, τ)
A · (1− τ)(1− α)kα (31)
τ = h(k) (32)
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A solution to the above equations is represented by a pair (k∗, τ ∗). Define k∗ = g(τ),
as the value of of k∗ which solves equation (31) for any admissible τ . Then τ ∗ = h(k∗)
solves the optimal tax at this steady state. As we shall see, the interaction of optimal
environmental policy with the non-convexities associated with effects of pollution create
an even richer set of possible steady state equilibria than in the exogenous tax case.
Before identifying these possibilities, we shall characterise the dynamic properties of
different types of steady states, should each one exist. We shall then use a graphical
approach to jointly charcterise the existence and dynamic properties of various steady
states.
It is easy to show that
g′(τ) =
∂G(k∗)
∂τ
1− G′(k∗)
. (33)
where ∂G(k)/∂τ is given by equation (19).
The dynamics of the economy with optimal taxes are traced out by recursive application
of h and G. For any capital kt > k˜, τt = h(kt). Then, next period’s capital stock follows:
kt+1 =
pi(h(kt), kt)
1 + pi(h(kt), kt)
A(1− h(kt))(1− α)k
α
t = G(h(kt), kt)
and so on.
This represents a first-order difference equation in kt for any arbitrary k0. Linearising
around a steady state, the local dynamics are determined by the sign and magnitude
of the expression
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
k∗
= G′(k∗) +
∂G(k∗)
∂τ
h′(k∗)
Using equation (33), the above can be expressed as:
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
k∗
= G′(k∗) + g′(τ ∗)(1− G′(k∗))h′(k∗). (34)
where the sign of g′(τ ∗) is the same as (the opposite of) the sign of ∂G(k∗)/∂τ as and
when 1− G′(k∗) > 0 (< 0).
Recall that ∂G(k)/∂τ may be positive or negative (see Figure 2) and that G′(k∗) may
be greater than or less than one (see Figure 1). Several cases can arise depending on
the respective signs and magnitudes of the above terms.
We highlight the cases of interest. In each case in the sub-section below, we restrict
attention to dynamic paths which are monotonic, or equivalently, in which the right-
hand side of equation (34) is non-negative.
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4.4.1 Non-oscillatory paths:
1. A stable neoclassical steady state:
This case requires two conditions: (i) the transformation map cuts the 45o line from
above (G′(k∗) < 1) and (ii) an increase in the environmental tax rate has the con-
ventional effect of lowering the steady state capital stock (∂G(k∗)/∂τ < 0) . The
combination of these suggests that g′(τ ∗) < 0. From equation (34),
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
∗
k
< 1,
so that the steady state is locally stable. Note that this is a ‘well-behaved’ case since
it could be consistent with the possibility that G(k) lacks a convex portion, leading to
a unique steady state. It also embodies conventional effects from higher taxes to the
steady state capital stock. The resulting steady state would be stable under exogenous
taxes and it remains stable with optimal taxes.21
Figure 4 depicts the local dynamics around this type of steady state.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows a family of transformation maps for kt+1 as a function
of kt. Each map is underpinned by a specific value of the environmental tax, τt.
The lower panel depicts the functions g(τ) and h(k) in (τ − k) space. h(k) is always
upward sloping in this space but in keeping with case 1, g(τ) is downward sloping.
Their intersection gives the combination of steady state capital and steady state taxes,
(τ ∗ − k∗). This is the unique long-run steady state in the case depicted.
Starting at k0 < k˜, the latter defined earlier as the minimum level of capital associated
with active environmental policy, the optimal tax at t = 0 is τ0 = 0. The steady state
associated with this tax is the highest dashed transformation map on the top panel,
which is labeled g(0). If the tax rate was held constant at this level, the capital stock
would evolve monotonically towards g(0) through iterative application of this map.
Thus at t = 0, next period’s capital, k1, will be given by the vertical projection to
this map from k0. But when the economy reaches k1, the optimal tax for that period
need no longer equal zero. Indeed, as drawn, the threshold level of capital is crossed
and optimal τ1 > 0, as given by the projection down from k1 to h(k). At τ1, the
horizontal projection to g(τ) gives the new steady state level of capital that would
arise if the tax rate were held constant at τ1. This means that the transformation map
in the upper panel shifts downwards so it intersects the 45o line at g(τ1). The vertical
21
G(k) would lack a convex portion if the conditions of Assumption 2 fail to be satisfied, implying
relatively weak effects of pollution and income on life expectancy.
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Figure 3: A stable neoclassical steady state
projection from k1 to the new transformation map gives k2 and so on. The dynamics
are monotonically convergent with both kt and τt rising in ever shorter steps towards
the steady state.
2. Dynamics of optimal taxation around a poverty trap:
In this case, the steady state map cuts the 45o line from below (G′(k∗) > 1).
An exogenous increase in the tax rate would widen the poverty trap by increasing the
steady state capital stock (g′(τ) > 0). In this case it can be shown by using equation
(34) that
G
′(k∗) + g′(τ)(1− G′(k∗))h′(k∗)
{
<
>
}
1 as g′(τ)h′(k)
{
>
<
}
1
so that a poverty trap with optimal taxes could be either locally unstable (if g′(τ)h′(k) >
1) or locally stable (g′(τ)h′(k) < 1). Note that in the case of uniform exogenous taxes,
the steady state would be unambiguously unstable. Figures 5 and 6 respectively show
the local dynamics for these cases.
Figure 5 shows the unstable case. The long-run steady state is at (τ ∗, k∗) where g(τ)
and h(k) intersect. Note that the condition under which this case arises requires that
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Figure 4: A locally unstable poverty trap
h′(k) > 1/g′(tau) at the steady stae. This in turn requires that h(k) lies below g(τ) to
the left of the steady state in the bottom half of Figure 5.
The economy starts at k0 < k
∗ and the initial tax rate is τ0 as shown on the lower panel.
The steady state associated with this tax rate, g(τ0) lies above k0 (since g(τ) lies to
the right of h(k) at this point). Because the steady state is locally unstable, according
to the transformation map associated with it, k1 < k0. The tax rate associated with
k1 is τ1 < τ0 and the steady state associated with that tax rate is even lower, so that
k2 < k1. Indeed at k2, the optimal tax rate drops to zero and stays there, while the
capital stock itself converges over time to the trivial steady state.
In Figure 6, we again have a poverty trap at the interior steady state (τ ∗, k∗). In this
case, h′(k) < 1/g′(τ), so that h(k) lies above g(τ) to the left of the steady state in the
bottom half of Figure 6.
When we start at a low level of capital, k0 < k
∗ and tax rate τ0 < τ
∗, the transformation
map associated with τ0 results in a steady state g(τ0) < k0. Because g(τ0) is unstable
this means that k1 > k0. This sets the economy on a convergent path towards (τ
∗, k∗),
as can be seen by further iterations of the dynamics at t = 1 and t = 2.
Intuitively, Figure 5 represents a case in which it is optimal to impose an environmental
tax at fairly low levels of steady state capital, but subsequent increases in this capital
do not result in large increases in the tax rate. This is reflected in the fact that the
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Figure 5: A locally stable poverty trap
h(k) locus cuts the g(τ) locus from below. When the initial capital stock lies below
the long-run steady state, the optimal tax rate associated with that capital stocks
maps into a (transitory) steady state that lies above the initial capital stock. Since
each transitory steady state, i.e. steady state associated with a tax rate that is held
hypothetically constant, are unstable, this pushes the capital stock further below the
long-run steady state, and so on.
By contrast, Figure 6 reflects a case in which a positive optimal tax arises only at
a relatively high level of steady state capital but is subsequently fairly sensitive to
increases in capital. This results in h(k) cutting g(τ) from above. When the initial
capital stock is below the steady state, the optimal tax rate associated with that
capital stock maps into an associated (transitory) steady state which lies below the
initial capital stock. This results in next period’s capital stock being higher than the
initial one and closer to the long-run steady state.
3: An unstable neoclassical steady state under optimal taxation:
We now consider the case g′(τ) < 0 and G′(k∗) < 1.22 This case arises when higher
taxes lead to higher levels of capital in the steady state. As discussed in Section 4.2,
22A fourth possibility is that g′(τ) > 0 and G′(k∗) > 1, i.e. the steady state with exogenous taxes
is unstable and an increase in the tax rate decreases the steady state capital stock. In this case, the
steady state with optimal taxes is unambiguously a source.
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Figure 6: A locally unstable non-poverty trap steady state.
this effect is more likely to occur at the neoclassical steady state on the exogenous-tax
economy. In this case, the stability condition of case 2 is reversed, i.e.
G
′(k∗) + g′(τ)(1− G′(k∗))h′(k∗)
{
<
>
}
1 as g′(τ)h′(k)
{
<
>
}
1
Figure 7 shows the local dynamics associated with the unstable case, i.e. when
g′(τ)h′(k) > 1. 23 The steady state (τ ∗, k∗) would be monotonically stable if the
tax rate were held constant at that value. When the tax rate is chosen optimally,
however, we can see that the steady state becomes unstable for the case drawn. Since
(i) both g(τ) and h(k) slope upwards in (τ − k) space and (ii) g(τ) cuts h(k) from
below, then for any initial k0 > k
∗ (as shown in the diagram), g(τ0) > k0 . And since
each potential steady state associated with a given tax rate is locally stable, k1 > k0
so that the economy moves away from k∗.
23The stable is analytically similar to case 1 so we do not address it separately.
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4.4.2 Optimal fluctuations:
We shall now investigate the possibility that equation (34) has a negative root. Recall
that in Section 3, we acknowledged the possibility that the transformation map G(k∗)
might itself slope downwards for an exogenous and constant value of τ . This would lead
to local oscillations, as in Palivos and Varvarigos [2011]. We exclude this possibility by
imposing G′(k∗) > 0. Even so, it is possible that when the effects of optimal taxes are
taken into account, oscillation arise if the following condition is met:
G
′(k∗) + g′(τ ∗)(1− G′(k∗))h′(k∗) < 0
or, equivalently
G
′(k∗)
1− G′(k∗)
< −g′(τ ∗)h′(k∗). (35)
There are two situations in which this inequality can arise. Both involve steady states
that would be locally stable if we were to impose monotonicity on the local dynamics.
These are the cases depicted in Figures 4 and 6. Note that both these cases result in
the root of equation (34) being less than unity. In fact, in both cases, the root need
not even remain non-negative.
Consider Figure 8, in which all the conditions of Case 1 are met. However, as we
can see, the dynamic path starting at k0 cycles between the pair (τ0, k0) and (τ1, k1)
forever. Intuitively this happens because, (i) h(k) is quite ‘flat’, i.e. a large change in
k induces a small increase in τ and (ii) G(k∗) is quite flat as it crosses the k∗ line. As a
consequence of these features, given that the economy starts at k0 < k
∗, (i) g(τ0) > k
∗
and (ii) k1 > k
∗. But given τ1 = h(k1), (i) g(τ1) < k
∗ and (ii) k2 < k
∗. Indeed, as
drawn k2 = k0 so the cycle is locally stable although this is not necessarily going to
be the case. The point is that oscillations can arise if these two features are present.
Mathematically we can see that both these features are implied by the inequality in
equation (35).
Turning to the case associated with Figure 6, it is instructive to express the inequality
in equation (35) as
−
G
′(k∗)
1− G′(k∗)
> g′(τ ∗)h′(k∗).
In other words, for cycles to arise, it requires some combination of two factors: (i)
the transformation map cuts the steady state line at a steep angle from below; (ii) a
relatively high sensitivity of the optimal tax to the capital stock. Figure 9 illustrates
this possibility. As drawn, the cycle that emerges when the economy starts at k0, is
explosive; however this need not be the case; the cycle could be stable or convergent.
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Figure 7: Oscillations around a neoclassical steady state.
The point is that with optimal taxation, not only can a poverty trap become locally
stable there can also be oscillations.
It is worth noting the difference with Palivos and Varvarigos [2011]: while they ar-
gue that environmental taxation can be used to eliminate cycles associated with the
impact of pollution on uncertain lifetimes, our results suggest that second-best welfare-
maximising environmental taxes can, in the same setting, be a source of oscillations.
4.4.3 Existence, uniqueness and stability of steady states:
We shall now consider the overall questions of existence, uniqueness and stability of
steady state equilibrium. The approach shall make use of the local analysis carried out
above. In Figure 10, we depict an economy in which multiple steady states arise at any
given tax rate. Thus, the locus g(τ) is D-shaped (note that the axes have been rotated
by 90o degrees anti-clockwise in relation to Figures 4-9). The locus h(k) is upward
sloping throughout. Because of the shape of g(τ), the existence of a steady state with
optimal taxes is not guaranteed. We have drawn three different versions of the h(k)
locus. With h1(k) and h2(k), there would be no interior steady state associated with
optimal tax policy. It is only with h(k) that interior steady states arise and in fact
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Figure 8: Cycles around a poverty trap.
there are two of them: the lower steady state, S1 has lower capital and lower taxation
and because it satisfies case 2a, is locally unstable. The higher steady state, S2 satisfies
case 1 and is stable. Note, however, that as shown in the previous sub-section, local
cycles are possible around this steady state. Both possibilities are illustrated in Figure
10.
In Figure 11, we show a case where h(k) cuts the k-axis at a point that lies inside the
D. It then cuts g(τ) at three interior points, S1, S2 and S3. Both S1 and S2 are poverty
traps and S3 is a ‘well-behaved’ steady state. S1 and S3 are both stable, although both
can give rise to cycles (the latter are shown only around S1). Thus while poverty traps
are always unstable under exogenous taxation, optimal policy can render them locally
stable.
Finally, Figure 12 presents another intriguing consequence of optimal policy. The
locus g(τ) is upward sloping reflecting the possibility noted in Section 4.2 that, around
a stable steady state with zero taxation, initial increases in the tax rate can lead to
increases in the steady state capital stock (for reasons explained in Section 4.2). If
at the same time, the optimal tax does not kick in at the zero-tax steady state, then
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Figure 9: Non-existence and multiplicity of steady states with optimal policy.
Figure 10: Multiple poverty traps.
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Figure 11: A locally unstable non-poverty trap
multiple steady states can arise with optimal taxation even in an economy in which
exogenous taxes would result in a unique steady state. This is the case shown in Figure
12.
In this diagram, the steady state S1 is unstable while the steady state S2 is stable. What
this suggests is that an economy that starts at a level of capital below S1 is caught
in an ‘environmental trap’ which results in successively lower levels of environmental
controls, resulting in successively lower levels of capital. A big push in environmental
protection might induce a move towards the higher steady state.
5 Relation to the Literature on Pollution, Mortal-
ity and Growth
There has been an increasing recent interest in the literature on the nexus between pol-
lution, mortality and growth. Our paper is related to Jouvet et al [2010]; Mariani et
al [2010], Pautrel [2007], [2011]; Raffin and Seegmuller [2012]; Varvarigos [2008], [2010]
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and Palivos and Varvarigos [2011]. These papers all assume a negative relationship be-
tween survival and environmental degradation.Many of them also adapt Chakraborty’s
[2004] model with overlapping generations and uncertain lifetimes. While resembling
this paper in these respects, on the key issues studied here, there are some important
differences. For example, although Pautrel [2007], [2011] and Jouvet et. al. [2010],
study first- and second-best environmental policies, they do not consider the possibility
of non-convexities and multiple steady states. Thus their insights differ in a qualitative
way from the ones developed in this paper. Of the papers which do focus on more com-
plex dynamics, Mariani et. al. [2010], Varvarigos [2010] and Palivos and Varvarigos
[2011] consider multiplicity of steady states while Varvarigos [2008] and Palivos and
Varvarigos [2011] consider the possibility of fluctuations around the long-run growth
path.
Of the papers that hypothesise the existence of poverty traps and multiple steady states,
both Mariani et al [2010] and Varvarigos [2010] assume step-wise discontinuities in the
relevant state spaces of their respective models; neither of their mechanisms relies on
a tradeoff between capital and pollution stocks in affecting survival probability, as in
our paper. Mariani et al [2010] assume that environmental quality is the only state
variable and that survival probability jumps once a threshold level of environmental
quality has been crossed. Thus the interaction between capital and pollution stocks in
affecting life expectancy is not studied.24
Varvarigos [2010] does consider capital accumulation in a model of environmental degra-
dation via pollution and, like us, assumes that survival probability depends positively
on income and negatively on pollution. However, he uses a specific functional form
for this relationship, which does not generate multiplicity of steady states. To obtain
the latter, he then assumes a step function in technology adoption such that at some
threshold level of capital firms find it profitable to escape pollution taxes by switching
to a ‘clean’ technology. While plausible, this explanation for multiple steady states
is somewhat orthogonal to the growth-pollution-lifetime nexus which forms the core
of this literature. Indeed, as our paper shows and contrary to the claim in Varvari-
gos [2010], the costs of pollution in terms of increased mortality are indeed sufficient
to guarantee multiple equilibria. In addition, environmental policy enters only to the
extent of an exogenous penalty for the use of dirty technology.
24Mariani et al [2010] also follow John and Pecchenino [1994] in assuming that abatement activities
affect environmental quality in an additively separable fashion from degradation activities, implying
that ‘abatement’ alone can be used to improve environmental quality even if there is no degradation
taking place to begin with. This possibility might be plausible for certain types of activities and
certain definitions of the ‘environment’ but as a general formulation, it has been criticised by, among
others, Economides and Philippopoulos [2008] and Varvarigos [2008].
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Palivos and Varvarigos [2011] comes closest to our paper in terms of the proposed ratio-
nale underlying multiple steady states. Like us, they emphasise the growth-pollution-
lifetime nexus as an underlying mechanism for generating multiple steady states. In
that respect the two papers are very similar. However, beyond that the issues they
highlight with the help of their mechanism are very different from those highlighted in
this paper.
Palivos and Varvarigos [2011] focus on the possibility of endogenous fluctuations around
the long-run growth path. The underlying intuition is similar in both papers: higher
life expectancy induces greater savings and capital accumulation which in turn in-
creases emissions, leading to lower life expectancy and lower savings. Although there
is considerable evidence, as cited in the Introduction, of a positive short-term link be-
tween emissions and mortality rates, it is not clear whether this in itself is capable of
generating the cyclical pattern of savings and capital accumulation which the above
hypothesis requires to complete the circle. Indeed if the increased mortality rates as-
sociated with higher pollution mainly affect the old and infirm or the very young, the
impact on savings would be negligible. Indeed, our analysis suggests that fluctuations
might arise not just in the context of Palivos and Varvarigos [2011] but also as a result
of second-best abatement policy.
The policy dimension of our paper is also quite different from both Varvarigos [2010]
and Palivos and Varvarigos [2011]. In both cases, one goal of environmental policy
is to eliminate fluctuations, something which is not conventionally considered to be
a goal of protecting the environment. In any case, neither considers a second-best
taxation regime. Varvarigos [2008] does not calculate any kind of optimal tax, while
Palivos and Varvarigos [2011] consider an allocation of given tax revenues between
pollution abatement and health-enhancing expenditures which maximises the survival
probability of young agents, rather than their welfare. Our policy analysis is different
not just in terms of objective functions and instruments but also in comparing the
qualitative properties of the growth path with and without second-best policy.
The contemporaneous paper of Raffin and Seegmuller [2012] is similar to our paper in
that it assumes the similar effects of capital on mortality: pollution increases mortality
and output decreases it. They use an AK model to study the existence of a poverty
trap, and how exogenous changes in taxes (similar to Section 3 of our paper) can change
the basins of attractions as taxes are varied. However, they do not do the normative
analysis of optimal taxation as in Section 4 of our paper.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied an economy in which environmental degradation is a by-product
of economic activity and negatively affects life expectancy. At the same time, economic
growth contributes a positive effect on life expectancy. We showed that an initially
bounded and subsequently convex relationship between life expectancy and its two
determinants can lead to multiple interior steady states, with an unstable poverty trap
and a stable, high income steady state. We examined the comparative static effects of
exogenous tax abatement policy and showed that this can hurt an initially poor country
while benefiting (in terms of higher levels of capital, income and life expectancy per
worker) an initially rich one.
We have also demonstrated the existence of an optimal environmental tax policy and
shown that it is non-homogeneous and monotonically increasing in the capital stock.
From a policy point of view, this suggests that economies that are close to or just
emerging from a poverty trap might impose zero or low levels of environmental protec-
tion but eventually this will rise along the growth path. This bears some resemblance
to the conditions of the Kyoto Protocol which requires over the longer term to increase
the set of countries that are required to take strong action.
At the same time we have shown that optimal policy might itself contribute to complex
dynamics in several ways: first, a steady state with optimal taxes might not exist
whereas in the underlying economy with exogenous policy, one or more interior steady
states existed; second, by inducing multiple steady states iunder conditions where a
unique steady state would exist with exogenous policy; third, by stabilising poverty
traps which would be unstable under exogenous policy; fourth, by inducing oscillations
and cycles around steady states which would otherwise be locally stable.
With respect to the last finding, we offer a word of caution. Although life expectancy
is related to pollution in the data, and indeed there is evidence that short term fluctu-
ations in air quality can lead to fluctuations in mortality rates (see Evans and Smith
[2005]), it is not clear that these phenomena are in turn part of a general business
cycle, i.e. there is a causal link between an economic boom, higher pollution, lower life
expectancy and then an economic downturn. But the point of our analysis has been to
identify the possibilities for complex dynamics that arise in the relationship between
health, pollution and economic growth and to sound a cautionary note on the use of
steady state models to study these relationships.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of ∂2/∂τ∂k:
Recall that
∂pi
∂τ
=
piAψγAkαδzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
Note that we can also write this as
∂pi
∂τ
=
piψγAkαδzδ−1
1 + zδ
Taking the derivative of the above with respect to k (after some straightforward rear-
rangement):
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
α
k
∂pi
∂τ
+
1
piA
∂pi
∂τ
∂piA
∂k
+
1
z(1 + zδ)
∂pi
∂τ
[(δ − 1)− (δ + 1)zδ]
∂z
∂k
where
∂piA
∂k
=
α
k
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)2
=
α
k
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)
pi(1 + zδ)
(pi + yβ))
and
∂z
∂k
=
αγ(1− ψτ)Akα
k
=
α(z − φz′)
k
The right hand side of the main derivative can be written as
∂pi
∂τ
[
α
k
+
(1 + zδ)
piA
αpi
k
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)(pi + yβ)
+
α
k
z − φz′
z(1 + zδ)
[(δ − 1)− (δ + 1)zδ]
]
Finally, expanding the term in square brackets involving zδ and noting the definition
of pi, we get
∂pi
∂τ
[
α
k
+
1
pi
{
αpi
k
(
β(1− pi)yβ
(1 + yβ)(pi + yβ)
−
(z − φz′)δzδ−1
(1 + zδ)
)
+
αpiδ
k
(z − φz′)
(1 + zδ)z
−
αpi
k
(z − φz′)
z
}]
;
from which, noting the definition of ∂pi/∂k, it follows that
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
∂pi
∂τ
1
k
[
α +
k
pi
∂pi
∂k
+
αδ(z − φz′)
(1 + zδ)z
− α +
αφz′
z
]
;
leading to the desired result.
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